Epistemic Inaccuracy and Degrees of Belief: Conceptual and Mathematical Foundations of Formal Epistemology
Leszek Wronski (Jagiellonian University, Poland) and Michał Tomasz Godziszewski (University of Warsaw, Poland)
In recent years a popular trend in formal epistemology has been to adopt an “accuracy-centered” perspective; that is, to attempt to justify epistemic norms by invoking the obligation of an ideally rational agent to minimize the expected inaccuracy of her beliefs, where inaccuracy is to be thought as some sort of “distance” from truth. It is traditional to point at nonpragmatic as introducing the topic of providing non-pragmatic justification for epistemic norms like probabilism (according to which the degrees of belief of an ideally rational agent should be captured by a classical probability function).
The aim of this INTRODUCTORY course is to give a thorough introduction to key methodological, conceptual and mathematical issues in the subject of epistemic inaccuracy and degrees of belief with an emphasis on Dutch
Book Arguments, pragmatic vs.\ epistemic justification of epistemic (mainly diachronic) norms, properties of various accuracy measures and related issues of reasoning about uncertainty spanning computer science, foundations of probability, philosophy, and statistics.